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Muhammad Aneeq uz Zaman, Kaiqing Zhang, Erik Miehling, and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract—In this paper, we study large population multi-
agent reinforcement learning (RL) in the context of discrete-
time linear-quadratic mean-field games (LQ-MFGs). Our set-
ting differs from most existing work on RL for MFGs, in that
we consider a non-stationary MFG over an infinite horizon. We
propose an actor-critic algorithm to iteratively compute the
mean-field equilibrium (MFE) of the LQ-MFG. There are two
primary challenges: i) the non-stationarity of the MFG induces
a linear-quadratic tracking problem, which requires solving a
backwards-in-time (non-causal) equation that cannot be solved
by standard (causal) RL algorithms; ii) Most RL algorithms
assume that the states are sampled from the stationary distribu-
tion of a Markov chain (MC), that is, the chain is already mixed,
an assumption that is not satisfied for real data sources. We first
identify that the mean-field trajectory follows linear dynamics,
allowing the problem to be reformulated as a linear quadratic
Gaussian problem. Under this reformulation, we propose an
actor-critic algorithm that allows samples to be drawn from
an unmixed MC. Finite-sample convergence guarantees for the
algorithm are then provided. To characterize the performance
of our algorithm in multi-agent RL, we have developed an
error bound with respect to the Nash equilibrium of the finite-
population game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the tremendous progress of
reinforcement learning (RL) [1]–[4] and planning [5], [6]
in multi-agent settings; see [7] for a recent overview of
multi-agent RL (MARL). The primary challenge that MARL
algorithms face is their scalability due to the exponential in-
crease in complexity in the number of agents. This difficulty
prevents the use of many MARL algorithms in real-world
applications, e.g., [8], [9].
To address this challenge, we focus on the framework
of mean-field games (MFGs), originally introduced in [10],
[11]. The core idea is that the interaction among a large
population of agents is well-approximated by the aggregate
behavior of the agents, or the mean-field trajectory, where the
influence of each agent has a negligible effect on the mass.
Following the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle
[12], the solution to an MFG, referred to as a mean-field
equilibrium (MFE), can be obtained by computing a best-
response to some mean-field trajectory that is consistent with
the aggregate behavior of all agents. This decouples the
solution process into the computation of a best-response for a
fixed mean-field trajectory, and the update of the mean-field
trajectory. Computation of the best-response can be done
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in a model-free fashion using single-agent RL techniques
[13]. The computed MFE provides a reasonably accurate
approximation of the actual Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the
corresponding finite-population dynamic game, a common
model for MARL [14]. Due to this desired property, there
have been a growing interest in studying RL algorithms in
MFGs [15]–[19].
Serving as a standard, but significant, benchmark for gen-
eral MFGs, linear-quadratic MFGs (LQ-MFGs) [14], [20],
have received significant attention in the literature. Under
this setting, the cost function describing deviations in the
state from the mean-field state, as well as the magnitude of
the control, are assumed to be quadratic while the transition
dynamics are assumed to be linear. Intuitively, the cost causes
each agent to track the collective behavior of the population,
which, for any fixed mean-field trajectory, leads to a linear-
quadratic tracking (LQT) subproblem for each agent. While
most of the work has been done in the continuous-time
setting [14], [20], [21], the discrete-time counterpart, the
focus of our paper, has received relatively less attention [22].
Despite the existence of learning algorithms for specific
classes of MFGs [15]–[19], the current literature does not
apply to the LQ-MFG setting; see the related work subsection
for a complete comparison. Most relevant to our setting is
the recent independent work of [19] in which each agent’s
subproblem, given any fixed mean-field trajectory, is treated
as a linear quadratic regulator (LQR) with drift. This is
possible due to the restriction to mean-field trajectories that
are constant over time (referred to as stationary mean-
fields in the literature [16]). This is in contrast to the LQT
subproblems in the LQ-MFG literature [14], [20], [21] – a
more standard setup and one we follow in this paper. While
the former admits a causal optimal control that can be solved
for using RL algorithms for LQR problems [23], [24], the
latter leads to a non-causal optimal control problem, which is
well known to be challenging from a model-free perspective
[25], [26]. We present conditions such that the mean-field
trajectory, of the MFE, follows linear dynamics. Hence, we
can restrict attention to linear mean-field trajectories, allow-
ing for a causal reformulation that enables the development
of model-free RL algorithms.
Furthermore, some recent RL algorithms for MFGs as-
sume that data samples are drawn from the stationary dis-
tribution of a Markov chain (MC) under some policy [19],
and sometimes even done so independently [27]. Though
facilitating analyses, data trajectories in practice are usually
sampled from an unmixed MC. Our analyses reflect this more
realistic sampling scheme.
Contribution. We develop a provably convergent RL algo-
rithm for non-stationary and infinite-horizon discrete-time
LQ-MFGs, inspired by the formulations of [14], [22]. Our
contribution is three-fold: (1) By identifying useful linearity
properties of the MFE, we develop an actor-critic algorithm
that addresses the non-stationarity of the MFE; as opposed
to [19], [28]; (2) We provide a finite-sample analysis of
our actor-critic algorithm, under the more realistic sampling
setting with unmixed Markovian state trajectories; (3) We
quantify the error bound of our approximate MFE obtained
from the algorithm, as an ǫ-NE of the original finite-
population MARL problem.
Related Work. Rooted in the original MFG formulation
[10], [11], [29], LQ-MFGs have been proposed mostly for
the continuous-time setting [14], [20], [21] and less so for
the discrete-time setting [19], [22], [28]. Our previous work
[28] proposes an MFE approximation algorithm and does
not study the linearity properties of the MFE. Recently, the
work of [19] has also considered learning in discrete-time
LQ-MFGs. However, the subproblem therein (given a fixed
mean-field trajectory) is modeled as an LQR problem with
drift. This deviation from the convention [14], [20], [21]
yields a problem that can be solved using RL algorithms
for LQR problems. In particular, an actor-critic algorithm
was developed in [19] to find the stationary MFE.
Beyond the LQ setting, there is a burgeoning interest in
developing RL algorithms for MFGs [15]–[18], [30]. To
emphasize the relationship between MFG and RL, most work
[16]–[18] has studied the discrete-time setting. In particular,
[16], [17] develop both policy-gradient and Q-learning based
algorithms, but with a focus on MFGs with a stationary
MFE. In contrast, [18] is the first paper that considers
non-stationary MFEs. However, the results therein do not
apply to the LQ-MFG model of the present paper, since
[18] considered finite horizons, and the state-action spaces,
though continuous, are required to be convex and compact.
More recently, [27] proposed a fitted-Q learning algorithm
for MFGs, which learns a stationary MFE. In fact, as pointed
out in [16], all prior work was restricted to either stationary
MFGs or finite-horizon settings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the LQ-MFG problem and discover
useful linearity properties of the MFE, offering a characteri-
zation of the MFE. We then develop an actor-critic algorithm
in Section III, followed by the finite-sample and finite-
population analyses in Section IV. Concluding remarks are
provided in Section V. Proofs of Proposition 2 and Theorems
1 and 2 are given in abbreviated form due to page limitations;
an extended version of the paper is available from the authors
upon request.
II. LINEAR-QUADRATIC MEAN-FIELD GAMES
Consider a dynamic game with N < ∞ agents playing
on an infinite horizon. Each agent n ∈ [N ] is responsible
for controlling its own state, denoted by Znt ∈ Rm, via
selection of control actions, denoted by Unt ∈ Rp. The state
process corresponding to each agent n evolves according to
the following linear time-invariant (LTI) dynamics,
Znt+1 = AZ
n
t +BU
n
t +W
n
t , (1)
with state matrix A ∈ Rm×m, input matrix B ∈ Rm×p, and
noise terms Wnt , t = 0, 1, . . ., independently and identically
distributed with Gaussian distribution N (0,Σw). The pair
(A,B) is assumed to be controllable. For each n, the initial
state Zn0 is generated by distribution N (ν0,Σ0).1 Each agent
n’s initial state is assumed to be independent of the noise
terms, Wns , n ∈ [N ], s = 1, 2, . . ., and other agents’
initial states, Zn
′
0 , n
′ 6= n. At the beginning of each time
step, each agent observes every other agent’s state.2 Thus,
under perfect recall, the information of agent n at time t is
Int =
(
(Z10 , . . . , Z
N
0 ), U
n
0 ; . . . ; (Z
1
t−1, . . . , Z
N
t−1), U
n
t−1; (Z
1
t ,
. . . , ZNt )
)
. A control policy for agent n at time t, denoted
by πnt , maps its information I
n
t to a control action U
n
t ∈ Rp.
The sequence of control policies for agent n is called a
control law πn := (πn0 , π
n
1 , . . .) with the set of all control
laws denoted by Π . The joint control law is the collection
of control laws over all n, denoted by π = (π1, . . . , πN ). The
agents are coupled via their expected cost functions, which
penalizes both the control magnitude and the deviation of
each agent’s state from the average state. The expected cost
for agent n under joint control law π, denoted by JNn (π
n,
π−n), is defined as
JNn (π
n, π−n) :=
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
[∥∥∥Znt − 1N − 1
∑
n′ 6=n
Zn
′
t
∥∥∥2
CZ
+
∥∥Unt ∥∥2CU
]
,
(2)
where the norms for the state and control terms are taken
with respect to the symmetric matrices 0 ≤ CZ ∈ Rm×m,
0 < CU ∈ Rp×p, respectively. The pair (A,C1/2Z ) is assumed
to be observable. The expectation in (2) is taken with respect
to the probability measure induced by the joint control law π,
the initial state distribution, and the noise statistics. The state
average term in (2), can be considered as a reference signal
that each agent n aims to track. We refer to this problem as
an LQT problem.
The mean-field approach centers around the introduction
of a generic (representative) agent that reacts to the average
state, or mean-field trajectory, of the other agents. With some
abuse of notation, the state of the generic agent at time t is
denoted by Zt which evolves as a function of control actions,
denoted by Ut ∈ Rp, in an identical fashion to Eq. (1), i.e.,
Zt+1 = AZt +BUt +Wt, (3)
where Z0 is generated by distribution N (ν0,Σ0) and Wt is
an i.i.d. noise process generated according to the distribution
N (0,Σw), assumed to be independent of the agent’s initial
1Although we assume the initial state to have a Gaussian distribution, it
can be any distribution with finite second moment.
2This is a game of full shared history. We will see later that actually full
sharing of the state information is not needed, and with each agent accessing
only its local state with no memory will be sufficient.
state. A generic agent’s control policy at any time t, denoted
by µt, maps (i) the generic agent’s history at time t, given
by It = (Z0, U0, . . . , Ut−1, Zt), and (ii) the mean-field
trajectory (i.e. average state trajectory of the other agents),
given by Z¯ = {Z¯0, Z¯1, . . .}, to a control action Ut = µt(It,
Z¯) ∈ Rp. The collection of control policies across time
is termed a control law and is denoted by µ = (µ0, µ1,
. . .) ∈ M where M is defined as the space of admissible
control laws. The generic agent’s expected cost under control
law µ, denoted by J(µ, Z¯), is defined as
J(µ, Z¯)=lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
[
ct(Zt, Z¯t, Ut)
]
, (4)
where ct(Zt, Z¯t, Ut) = ‖Zt − Z¯t‖2CZ + ‖Ut‖2CU is the
instantaneous cost and the expectation is taken with respect
to the control law µ and initial state and noise statistics. The
mean-field trajectory Z¯ , is assumed to belong to the space
of deterministic bounded sequences, that is, Z¯ ∈ Z where
Z = ℓ∞ := {x = (x0, x1, . . .) | supt≥0 |xt| < ∞}.3 The
mean-field trajectory in (4) can be viewed as a reference
signal, resulting in an LQT problem.
To define an MFE, first define the operator Λ : M →
Z as a mapping from the space of admissible control laws
M to the space of mean-field trajectories Z . Due to the
information structure of the problem and the form of the cost
function, namely (4), the policy at any time depends only on
the current state Zt and the mean-field trajectory Z¯ , and not
all of the current information It [22]. Thus, M is the space
of policies that maps the current state to a control action.
The operator Λ is defined as follows: given µ ∈ M, the
mean-field trajectory Z¯ = Λ(µ) is constructed recursively as
Z¯t+1 = AZ¯t +Bµt(Z¯), Z¯0 = ν0, (5)
where the policy µt depends on the entire sequence Z¯ . If
Z¯ = Λ(µ), then we refer to Z¯ as the mean-field trajectory
consistent with µ. Similarly, define an operator Φ : Z →
M as a mapping from a mean-field trajectory to its optimal
control law, also called the cost-minimizing controller,
Φ(Z¯) := argmin
µ∈M
J(µ, Z¯). (6)
The MFE can now be defined as follows.
Definition 1 ([29]). The tuple (µ∗, Z¯∗) ∈M×Z is an MFE
if µ∗ = Φ(Z¯∗) and Z¯∗ = Λ(µ∗).
The trajectory Z¯∗ is referred to as the equilibrium mean-
field trajectory and the controller µ∗ as the equilibrium
controller. Note our MFE is non-stationary, in contrast to
[16], [17], [19].4 We refer to the corresponding game as
a non-stationary LQ-MFG. By [22], the cost-minimizing
controller in (6) for any Z¯ ∈ Z is given by µ∗ = (µ∗1(Z1; Z¯),
µ∗2(Z2; Z¯), . . .) = Φ(Z¯) with
µ∗t (Zt; Z¯) = GPPAZt +GPλt+1(Z¯), (7)
3This assumption is validated in [22].
4We allow for time-varying equilibrium mean-field trajectories. Refer to
Definition (A3) in Section 2.2 of [16] for clarification.
where GP := −(CU +BTPB)−1BT , P is the unique pos-
itive definite solution to the discrete-time algebraic Riccati
equation (DARE),
P = ATPA+ CZ +A
TPBGPPA (8)
and is guaranteed to exist [31]. The sequence λ ∈ ℓ∞ is
generated according to,
λt(Z¯) = −
∞∑
k=0
HkPCZ Z¯t+k, for t = 0, 1, . . . , (9)
where HP := A
T (I + PBGP ). Substituting the cost-
minimizing control, (7) – (9), into the state equation of the
generic agent, (3), the closed-loop dynamics are given by
Zt+1 = H
T
PZt −BGP
∞∑
s=0
HsPCZ Z¯t+s+1 +Wt.
By aggregating these dynamics over all agents and invoking
Definition 1, the equilibrium mean-field trajectory obeys the
following recursive expression,
Z¯∗t+1 = H
T
P Z¯
∗
t −BGP
∞∑
s=0
HsPCZ Z¯
∗
t+s+1, (10)
for t = 0, 1, . . ., where Z¯∗0 = ν0.
Under some mild conditions, the recursion in (10) exhibits
desirable properties that allow conversion of the LQT prob-
lem of (4) to be expressed as an LQR problem (described in
the following section). To illustrate these properties, let M
be a square matrix of dimension m and define the operator
T : Rm×m → Rm×m as
T (M) := HTP − BGP
∞∑
s=0
HsPCZM
s+1. (11)
Consider a matrix F ∗ ∈ Rm×m s.t. F ∗ = T (F ∗); then a
candidate for Z¯∗ can be characterized by F ∗ as its mean-
field state matrix i.e. Z¯∗t+1 = F
∗Z¯∗t . We prove that under
the following assumption, F ∗ uniquely determines Z¯∗.
Assumption 1. Given A,B,CZ , CU and GP , HP , where
P , is the unique positive definite solution of (8), we have
TP := ‖HP‖2 + ‖BGP ‖2‖CZ‖2
(1− ‖HP ‖2)2 < 1.
Assumption 1 above is motivated from the literature [28],
[22]. It is stronger than the standard assumptions, e.g., [28],
but gives rise to desirable linearity properties of the MFE as
shown in Proposition 1 below.. This enables the conversion
of the LQT problem (3)–(4) into an LQG problem. This con-
version is core to the construction of our RL algorithm. Also,
since Assumption 1 below implies the primary Assumption
in [28], the existence and uniqueness of the MFE is ensured.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium mean-field
trajectory Z¯∗. Furthermore, Z¯∗ follows linear dynamics, that
is, there exists an F ∗ ∈ F := {F ∈ Rm×m : ‖F‖2 ≤
(1 + TP )/2}, such that Z¯∗t+1 = F ∗Z¯∗t for t = 0, 1, . . ., with
Z¯∗0 = ν0.
Proof. As Assumption 1 above implies Assumption 1 in
[28], the proof of existence and uniqueness of the MFE is
obtained in a similar manner. To prove that the equilibrium
mean-field trajectory evolves linearly, the operator T is
shown to be contractive on F. Let F1, F2 ∈ F,
‖T (F1)− T (F2)‖2
<
‖BGP ‖2‖CZ‖2
‖HP ‖2
∞∑
s=1
s‖HP ‖s2
∥∥F1 − F2∥∥2,
=
‖BGP ‖2‖CZ‖2
(1 − ‖HP ‖2)2
∥∥F1 − F2∥∥2.
The inequality is obtained by the fact that ‖F1‖2, ‖F2‖2 < 1
and that for any two square matrices A,B, and any k ∈
Z , Ak − Bk = ∑k−1l=0 Ak−l−1(A − B)Bl. Hence under
Assumption 1, the operator T is a contraction mapping.
As F is a complete metric space, using the Banach fixed
point theorem, we can deduce the existence of F ∗ ∈ F
s.t. F ∗ = F(F ∗). Hence if we define a sequence Z¯∗ s.t.
Z¯∗0 = µ0 and Z¯
∗
t+1 = F
∗Z¯∗t , then it satisfies the dynamics
of the equilibrium mean-field trajectory (10) and as the
equilibrium mean-field trajectory is unique, it follows linear
dynamics.
Notice that as F ∗ ∈ F, Z¯ is asymptotically stable. The
following property of T will be useful later. It can be proved
by using the definition of TP in Assumption 1.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, ‖T (F )‖2 ≤ TP , and hence
T (F ) ∈ F, for all F ∈ F.
While agents are aware of the functional form of the
dynamics and cost functions, no agent has knowledge of the
true model parameters. As such, we aim to develop an RL
algorithm for learning the MFE in the absence of model
knowledge. The remainder of the paper is devoted to this
task.
III. ACTOR-CRITIC ALGORITHM FOR NON-STATIONARY
LQ-MFGS
The fact that the equilibrium mean-field trajectory follows
linear dynamics enables us to develop RL algorithms for
solving the non-stationary MFE, in contrast to the stationary
case of [19]. Specifically, as a result of Proposition 1, it
suffices to find the MFE by searching over the set of stable
matrices F defined therein. Moreover, given any mean-field
trajectory Z¯ parameterized by its mean-field state matrix F ∈
F, the LQT problem in (4) can be written as an LQG problem
with an augmented state Xt = (Z
T
t , Z¯
T
t )
T . The augmented
state follows linear dynamics
Xt+1 = A¯Xt + B¯Ut + W¯t, (12)
with
A¯ =
(
A 0
0 F
)
, B¯ =
(
B
0
)
, W¯t =
(
Wt
0
)
, (13)
where Wt is the noise term in (3) and consequently W¯t ∼
N (0,Σw¯), and Σw¯ = [I 0]TΣw[I 0]. Accordingly, the cost
in (4) can be written as
J(K,F ) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[ct(Xt, Ut)], (14)
where ct(Xt, Ut) = ‖Xt‖2CX + ‖Ut‖2CU , Ut = −KXt
where the structure is motivated by (7), and CX =[
CZ −CZ
−CZ CZ
]
is positive semi-definite. With some abuse
of notation (in relation to (4)), the cost functional in (14)
takes as input the matrix K , replacing the control law µ,
and the matrix F , replacing the mean-field trajectory Z¯ (as
a result of Proposition 1). As an upshot of the reformulation,
the cost-minimizing controller given F can be obtained in
a model-free way using RL algorithms that solve LQG
problems. Hence, by the NCE principle [14], the MFE can
be approximated in a model free setting, by recursively: (1)
finding the approximate cost-minimizing controllerK for the
system (12)-(14) in a model-free setting, and (2) updating
mean-field state matrix F in (13).
We first deal with finding the cost-minimizing controller
for the system (12)-(14) in a model-free setting. One method
to achieve that is RL for LQG problem. The recent work
of [13] uses a natural policy gradient actor-critic method
to solve such a problem, albeit the MC (for sampling) is
assumed to be fully mixed. We adapt this method for an
unmixed but fast-mixing MC. Hence we adapt the actor-critic
method of [13], to the unmixed fast-mixing MC setting, to
find the approximate cost-minimizing controller.
We briefly outline the actor-critic algorithm [13] and our
modification to account for the unmixed MC. Each iteration
s ∈ [S] of the algorithm involves two steps, namely the actor
and the critic. The critic observes, the state of the system
Xt, the control actions Ut = KXt + ζt (where ζt is an
i.i.d. Gaussian noise for exploration and K is a stabilizing
controller), and the instantaneous cost ct for t ∈ {0, . . . ,
T − 1}.
The fundamental modification is that by having the to-
tal number of timesteps T , also depending on the initial
state X0, we can prove convergence of the critic step for
the unmixed fast-mixing MC setting. This dependence is
presented in Proposition 2 in the next section. The critic
produces an estimate θˆ, of the parameter vector θ, which
characterizes the action-value function pertaining to K . Once
the estimate θˆ is obtained, the actor updates the controller in
the direction of the natural policy gradient as given in [13].
After S actor-critic updates we arrive at the approximate
cost-minimizing controller for system (12)-(14). As per [13],
the approximate cost-minimizing controller is close to the
actual cost-minimizing controller, provided that S and T are
chosen judiciously.
Now we deal with updating the mean-field state matrix F
in (13), given the cost-minimizing controller K (computed
in the previous step). The state aggregator is a simulator,
which computes the new mean-field state matrix F ′ given
K , by simulating the mean-field trajectory consistent with
controller K . Hence it fulfills the role of operator Λ for
linear feedback controllers. The state aggregator is similar
to the simulators used in [17], [18]. To obtain F ′, we first
model the behavior of a generic agent with dynamics (3),
under controller K ,
Zt+1 = AZt +B(−KXt) +Wt,
= (A−BK1)Zt −BK2Z¯ ′t +Wt, (15)
where Xt = [Z
T
t , (Z¯
′
t)
T ]T and K = [KT1 ,K
T
2 ]
T . Notice
that the controller K is online with respect to the mean-field
trajectory Z¯ ′ as per the definition of K . By aggregating (15),
the updated mean-field trajectory Z¯ ′ is shown to follow linear
dynamics:
Z¯ ′t+1 = F
′Z¯ ′t, where F
′ = A−B(K1 +K2). (16)
Hence the state aggregator updates the mean-field state
matrix to F ′ in equation (13) given the cost-minimizing
controller K . In the next section we show that if F is table,
F ′ will be stable as well.
The combination of the actor-critic algorithm for LQG
and the state aggregator (16), as outlined in Algorithm 1,
essentially performs an approximate and data-driven update
of the operator T (as in (10)). In section IV we prove finite-
sample bounds to show convergence of Algorithm 1. The
critic and actor steps are standard, and thus details have been
omitted; see [19], [32]
Algorithm 1: Actor-critic for LQ-MFG
1: Input: Number of iterations: R, {Sr : r ∈ [R]},
{Ts,r : s ∈ [Sr], r ∈ [R]}.
2: Initialize: F (1) ∈ F and stabilizing K(1,1)
3: for r ∈ [R] do
4: for s ∈ [Sr] do
5: Critic Step Compute θˆ(s,r) using Xt, Ut and ct
for t ∈ {0, . . . , T(s,r) − 1}
6: Actor Step Compute K(s+1,r) using θˆ(s,r) and
K(s,r)
7: end for
8: Update mean-field trajectory F (r+1) using state
aggregator and K(Sr,r) (by (16))
9: K(1,r+1) ← K(Sr,r)
10: end for
11: Output: K(SR,R), F (R)
IV. ANALYSIS
We now provide non-asymptotic convergence guarantees
for Algorithm 1. Moreover, we also provide an error bound
for the approximate MFE output, as generated by Algorithm
1, with respect to the NE of the finite population game.
A. Non-asymptotic convergence
We begin by presenting the convergence result of the critic
step in the algorithm. The output of this step is the parameter
vector estimate θˆ(s,r) which is shown to be arbitrarily close
to the true parameter vector θ(s,r) given that the number of
time-steps in the critic step Ts,r is sufficiently large.
Proposition 2. For any r ∈ [R] and s ∈ [Sr], the parameter
vector estimate θˆ(s,r) satisfies
‖θˆ(s,r) − θ(s,r)‖2F ≤ κ(s,r)1
log6 Ts,r√
Ts,r
,
with probability at least 1−T−4s,r . The variable κ(s,r)1 depends
on the initial state X0 and controllers K
(1,r) and K(s,r).
Proof Sketch. The proof is an adaptation of the technique
used in [13] and the reader can refer to it for omitted
details. We provide the main idea of the proof and how it is
modified to cater for the unmixed MC setting. The problem
of estimating the parameter vector θ(s,r) is first formulated as
a minimax optimization problem. Then the estimation error,
‖θˆ(s,r) − θ(s,r)‖2F , is shown to be upper bounded by the
duality gap of that minimax problem. Using results from
[33] an explicit expression is obtained for the duality gap.
The technique used in [13] to prove convergence of the
critic, assumes that Xt and Ut are bounded. Towards that
end consider the event, E := ⋂T−1t=0 {∣∣∥∥Xt∥∥22 + ∥∥Ut∥∥22 −
E
[∥∥Xt∥∥22 + ∥∥Ut∥∥22]∣∣ < C1}, where T = Ts,r. We will
obtain a lower bound for the probability P(E). This lower
bound will contribute to the probabilistic guarantees of the
lemma. To that end, let us first define an event Et :={∣∣∥∥Xt∥∥22 + ∥∥Ut∥∥22 − E[∥∥Xt∥∥22 + ∥∥Ut∥∥22]∣∣ ≥ C1,t}, for
t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. Due to the fact that the MC is not
mixed, the random vectors Xt and Ut have non-zero mean,
non-stationary marginal distributions. This is opposed to the
mixed MC setting of [13], which leads to Xt and Ut having
zero mean and stationary marginal distributions. Hence we
develop a method to lower bound P(E) in the unmixed MC
setting. Towards that end we first define quantities, Vt and
vt such that Vt = [(Xt −LtKX0)T , (Ut −KLtKX0)T ]T and
vt = 2
〈[ LtKX0
KLtKX0
]
, Vt
〉
, where LK = A−BK and K is
a stabilizing controller. As a result of the definition, Vt and
vt are zero mean Gaussian variables and ‖Xt‖22 + ‖Ut‖22 =
‖Vt‖22 + vt. The stationary distributions of Vt and vt are
denoted by N (0,Σ∞v ) and N (0, σ∞v ) and are conditional
on X0. We define two events to bound the concentration of
‖Vt‖22 and
∣∣vt∣∣ separately: E∗t := {∣∣‖Vt‖22 − E[‖Vt‖22]∣∣ ≥
C2,t
}
, E ′t :=
{∣∣vt∣∣ ≥ C3}. The probability P(E∗t ) can
be upper bounded by using Hanson-Wright inequality and
P(E ′t) by using Gaussian concentration bounds. Using these
bounds we can deduce the upper bound on P(Et) and using
a union bound type argument lower bound P(E). This bound
will depend on ‖X0‖2 as a result of the MC Xt, Ut being
unmixed.
Note that in Proposition 2, κ
(s,r)
1 explicitly depends on
the initial state, X0. This dependence is due to the MC not
being fully mixed. Having proved a finite sample bound on
the estimation error for the critic step, we now state the
convergence guarantee for the actor-critic algorithm for fixed
mean-field trajectory [13]. In particular, the approximate
cost-minimizing controller found by the actor-critic K(Sr,r),
can be brought arbitrarily close to the cost-minimizing con-
troller K(∗,r), by choosing the number of iterations of critic,
Ts,r, and actor-critic, Sr, sufficiently large.
Proposition 3. For any r ∈ [R], let K(1,r) be a sta-
bilizing controller and Sr be chosen such that Sr ≥
κ
(r)
2 log(κ
(r)
3 /ǫr), for any ǫr > 0. Moreover, let Ts,r ≥
(κ
(s,r)
1 )
5/2ǫ−5r for s ∈ Sr. Then, with probability at least
1− ǫ10r ,
J(K(Sr,r), F (r))− J(K(∗,r), F (r)) ≤ ǫr,
‖K(Sr,r) −K(∗,r)‖F ≤ √κ4ǫr,
and K(s,r) are stabilizing for s ∈ Sr. The variable κ(s,r)1
is dependent on K(1,r),K(s,r) and initial state X0 (as
in Proposition 2). Variables κ
(r)
2 , κ
(r)
3 are dependent on
controller K(1,r) and κ4 is an absolute constant.
The first inequality and the stability guarantee in Proposi-
tion 3 follows from the proof of Theorem 4.3 in [13] and the
second inequality follows from Lemma D.4 in [19]. Next, we
provide the non-asymptotic convergence guarantee for Algo-
rithm 1. We prove that the output of Algorithm 1, also called
the approximateMFE (K(SR,R), F (R)), approaches the MFE
of the LQ-MFG (K∗, F ∗). We also provide an upper bound
on the difference in cost J under the approximate and the
exact MFE.
Theorem 1. For any r ∈ [R], let ǫr be defined such that
ǫr = κ
−1
4 min
(
ǫ2
22r+4‖B‖22
,
ǫ2
2
,
(1− TP )2
8‖B‖22
)
, (17)
and the number of iterations R satisfy, R ≥ log (2‖F (1) −
F ∗‖2ǫ−1
)
/ log(1/TP ), for any ǫ > 0. Then, with probability
at least 1 − ǫ5, F (r) ∈ F, K(1,r) is stabilizing for r ∈ [R],
and
‖F (R) − F ∗‖2 ≤ ǫ, ‖K(SR,R) −K∗‖2 ≤ (1 +D0)ǫ,
J(K(SR,R), F (R))− J(K∗, F ∗) ≤ D1ǫ,
where D0, D1 are absolute constants.
Proof Sketch. First we prove the bound on ‖F (R) − F ∗‖2.
We begin with upper bounding the quantity ‖F (r+1) −
F ∗‖2. This quantity is split into ‖F (r+1) − F¯ (r+1)‖2 +
‖F¯ (r+1) − F ∗‖2 where F¯ (r+1) = T (F (r)). First we bound
the second term, ‖F¯ (r+1)− F ∗‖2 = ‖T (F (r))−T (F ∗)‖ ≤
TP ‖F (r) − F ∗‖2. The inequality is due to the fact that T
is contractive with coefficient TP , from proof of Proposition
1. Using the definition of state aggregator (16), Proposition
3 and definition of ǫr in the statement of Theorem 1, we
deduce, ‖F (r+1)−F¯ (r+1)‖2 ≤ ǫ2−r−2 with high probability.
Consequently, ‖F (r+1)−F ∗‖2 ≤ TP ‖F (r)−F ∗‖2+ǫ2−r−2
with high probability. Using union bound type argument, we
arrive at ‖F (R) − F ∗‖2 ≤ ǫ with high probability. To prove
F (r) ∈ F for r ∈ [R], we use a recursive argument. Let
F (r) ∈ F for r ∈ [R]; using Proposition 3 and Lemma 1,
we obtain ‖F (r+1)‖2 ≤ (1 + TP )/2, and hence F (r+1) ∈ F
with high probability. Using union bound type argument, we
conclude that F (r) ∈ F for r ∈ [R] with high probability.
Moving onto the second bound, ‖K(SR,R) − K∗‖2 is
split into ‖K(SR,R)−K(∗,R)‖2 and ‖K(∗,R)−K∗‖2. Using
Proposition 3, ‖K(SR,R) − K(∗,R)‖2 ≤ ǫ with probability
at least 1 − ǫ10. Using the definition of K(∗,R), K∗, and
techniques similar to proof of Proposition 1, ‖K(∗,R) −
K∗‖2 ≤ D0ǫ, where D0 := ‖GP ‖2‖CZ‖2(1−‖HP ‖2)2 with high probabil-
ity. Hence we conclude that ‖K(SR,R)−K∗‖2 ≤ (1+D0)ǫ
with probability at least 1 − ǫ5. To prove that K(1,r) is a
stabilizing controller for (A¯(r), B¯) for 1 ≤ r ≤ R, we use a
recursive argument. Let K(1,r) be the stabilizing controller
for (A¯(r), B¯); then, with high probability, K(Sr,r) is also
a stabilizing controller for (A¯(r), B¯) using Proposition 3.
From Algorithm 1 we know that K(1,r+1) = K(Sr,r). Using
the definition of J(K,F ), it can be shown that J(K(1,r+1),
F (r+1)) = J(K(1,r+1), F (r)), and hence K(1,r+1) is a
stabilizing control for (A¯(r+1), B¯). As a result, using a union
bound type argument, we conclude thatK(1,r) is a stabilizing
controller for system (A¯(r), B¯) for 1 ≤ r ≤ R with high
probability. For the last bound, using definition of J(K,
F ), the fact that K(R) = K(SR,R) and K∗ are stable, we
can deduce, J(K(R), F (R)) − J(K∗, F ∗) ≤ D2
∥∥K(R) −
K∗
∥∥
F
+D3
∥∥K(R)−K∗∥∥2
F
, where D2 and D3 are constants.
Hence, using the bound ‖K(R) − K∗‖2 ≤ (1 + D0)ǫ, we
arrive at J(K(R), F (R)) − J(K∗, F ∗) ≤ D1ǫ, with high
probability.
B. Approximate ǫ-NE bound
We now quantify how the approximateMFE obtained from
Theorem 1 performs in the original finite population game.
Let us denote the control law generated by the approximate
MFE (F (R),K(SR,R)) in Algorithm 1 by µ˜.
Theorem 2. Let the output cost of Algorithm 1 for a finite
population LQ game for agent n be JNn (µ˜
n, µ˜−n), and
denote the NE cost of this game by infpin∈Π J
N
n (π
n, µ˜−n).
Then, if R = Ω(log(1/ǫ)) and N = Ω(1/ǫ2),
JNn (µ˜
n, µ˜−n)− inf
pin∈Π
JNn (π
n, µ˜−n) ≤ ǫ.
with probability at least 1− ǫ5.
Proof Sketch. The quantity JNn (µ˜
n, µ˜−n)− infpin∈Π JNn (πn,
µ˜−n) can be broken up into two terms,
JNn (µ˜
n, µ˜−n)− inf
pin∈Π
JNn (pi
n, µ˜−n) =
JNn (µ˜
n, µ˜−n)− J(K(SR,R), F (R))+
J(K(SR,R), F (R))− inf
pin∈Π
JNn (pi
n, µ˜−n). (18)
For simplicity let us denote Z¯ as the mean-field trajectory
and Z¯Nn = (Z¯
N
n,0, Z¯
N
n,1, . . .) where Z¯
N
n,t =
1
N−1
∑
n′ 6=n Z
n′
t
as the empirical mean-field trajectory under the control law
µ˜. Similarly, denote the trajectory of agent n under control
law πn ∈ Π by Znt . Using Lemma 3 in [22], since it is
applicable for any stabilizing controller,
JNn (µ˜
n, µ˜−n)− J(K(SR,R), F (R)) =
O
(√√√√lim sup
T→∞
Eµ˜
( T−1∑
t=0
∥∥Z¯Nn,t − Z¯t∥∥22)/T
)
. (19)
By defining a vector ZNn,t = [(Z¯
N
n,t)
T , Z¯Tt ]
T the expression
inside square root on the RHS of (19) can be expressed
as lim supT→∞ Eµ˜[
∑T−1
t=0 ‖ZNn,t‖2D/T ]. By expressing the
dynamics of ZNn,t, this expression can be shown to be the
cost of an LQR system which is O(1/(N − 1)).
Moving to the second expression in the RHS of (18), using
the definition of JNn (π
n, µ˜−n),
JNn (π
n, µ˜−n) ≥ J(K(SR,R), F (R))− 2D1‖F (1) − F ∗‖2TRP
+ lim sup
T→∞
2
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
[
(Znt − Z¯t)TCZ(Z¯t − Z¯Nn,t
]
(20)
with high probability. By techniques used in Lemma 4 in
[22], the last term on the RHS of (20) can be shown to be
O(
√
lim supT→∞ Eµ˜(
∑T−1
t=0 ‖Z¯Nn,t − Z¯t‖22)/T ), and hence
is O(1/√N − 1). Finally, if R = Ω(log(1/ǫ)) and N =
Ω(1/ǫ2), then by using the logic defined above, with high
probability JNn (µ˜
n, µ˜−n)− JNn (πn, µ˜−n) ≤ ǫ.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has proposed an RL algorithm to find the
non-stationary MFE of a LQ-MFG in a model-free setting.
This is obtained through a reformulation of the problem,
into a forward-in-time problem and generalizing existing RL
algorithms to the setting where the MC is assumed not to
be fully mixed. Furthermore, the approximate MFE obtained
through the RL algorithm, is shown to be an ǫ-NE.
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